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Corporate litigation and debt 
 
Matteo P. Arena 
Department of Finance, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI  
Abstract 
This study examines the effect of litigation risk and litigation costs on firms’ credit ratings and debt financing. 
The results show that litigation affects a firm's creditworthiness and debt costs in two stages. Before a lawsuit 
filing, firms at higher risk of litigation have lower credit ratings, are more likely to be rated speculative grade, pay 
higher yields on loans and bonds, and are less likely to rely on debt financing. At the time of the lawsuit 
resolution, settlement costs have an additional effect on firm credit quality. Companies facing larger settlement 
disbursements in relation to their available cash experience a decline in credit ratings and an increase in yield 
spread. The results are robust to endogeneity concerns and different proxies of litigation risk. 
Keywords 
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1. Introduction 
As the Deepwater Horizon rig exploded and started sinking in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010, British 
Petroleum (BP) experienced a significant increase in litigation risk. In the summer of 2010 Standard & 
Poor's downgraded BP long-term credit rating from AA, a rating that BP had maintained throughout its 
corporate history, down a full letter rating to A. The downgrade had significant implications for BP's 
cost of debt.1 Additionally, BP faced high reputational costs that manifested in a loss of customers and 
a decline in sales. As the case of BP clearly illustrates, litigation risk can have strong and lasting 
consequences on the creditworthiness and financing costs of corporations. This study contributes to 
the law and finance literature by thoroughly examining the effect of overall corporate litigation risk 
and lawsuit outcomes on firms’ credit quality, cost of debt, and debt issuance. 
After a small decline in lawsuits immediately following the ratification of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the number of corporate litigation filings started rising again with an 
increase of more than 50% in the last decade. Over the same period corporate litigation costs grew 
twofold (Arena and Ferris, 2017). As litigation has grown to become a major source of risk and costs for 
corporations, researchers have started to provide empirical evidence of the effect of litigation on firms’ 
policies and financial outcomes. Lowry and Shu (2002) and Arena and Julio (2015), among others, show 
that litigation risk has a significant effect on corporate financial decisions such as securities issuance, 
cash holdings, and capital expenditures. This study adds to the evidence by providing a thorough 
analysis of the relation between litigation and corporate debt to show that both litigation risk and the 
outcome of corporate lawsuits have a significant effect on a firm's creditworthiness and debt costs. 
The plaintiffs of a corporate lawsuit compete with other firm's stakeholders in their claim for corporate 
cash. Because many lawsuits are resolved by large settlements, creditors are likely to be one of the 
main corporate stakeholders’ groups affected by litigation. The effect of lawsuits on the ability of 
creditors to recover their lent funds from the defendant firm should lead to lower corporate credit 
ratings and higher firm's cost of debt. As firms rely more on corporate long-term debt (i.e., bonds and 
loans) than equity to raise capital (Henderson et al., 2006) litigation risk is likely to have strong 
implications on the firm's ability to raise funds and to invest in net present value opportunities. 
This study presents the most complete analysis on the effects of litigation on corporate debt to date by 
examining for the first time all corporate lawsuits and all types of corporate debt. Moreover, this study 
is the first to analyze the implication of actual settlement costs on credit ratings and yield spread. 
Other papers in this area (Autore et al., 2014, Deng et al., 2016, Yuan and Zhang, 2015) present only a 
partial picture of this issue by restricting their analysis to bank loan spreads and security class action 
lawsuits and by not including an analysis of the resolution of litigation risk through settlements. 
To fully understand the implication of litigation risk and costs on corporate debt policy, it is important 
to consider all types of debt companies have at their disposal as funding opportunities. As shown by 
Denis and Mihov (2003) and Arena (2011) about half of the corporate debt issues and more than half 
of the total debt volume come from corporate public bonds, 144-A debt placements and other non-
bank private debt. Moreover, this study further contributes to our understanding of the effect of 
litigation risk on corporate debt by considering for the first time a comprehensive sample of lawsuits. 
In addition to security class action lawsuits, the sample of this study includes product liability, 
copyright, patent, fraud, antitrust, trade regulation, and labor law lawsuits among others. In many 
cases the requested damages by the plaintiffs and the resulting settlement for non-security lawsuits is 
in the hundreds of millions of dollars. These types of lawsuits also generate large indirect costs to 
corporations (e.g., Engelmann and Cornell 1988; Karpoff and Lott 1993), with strong negative effects 
on creditors’ recovery prospects. By considering all types of lawsuits this study avoids potential biases 
in the estimation of litigation risk. 
This paper is also the first to present an examination of the resolution of litigation risk by analyzing the 
effect of settlement costs on yield spread and credit ratings. While credit rating agencies and 
debtholders can estimate litigation risk and factor it in when evaluating the firms’ creditworthiness, it 
is only at the time of the resolution of a lawsuit that the impact of litigation on firm's value can be fully 
evaluated. When settlements costs in comparison to available corporate cash holdings are higher than 
initially anticipated, company might need to raise additional debt capital to supplement their cash in 
hands to pay the plaintiffs. Credit ratings are likely to deteriorate and the cost of debt is likely to 
increase incrementally over the change that took place at the time of the filing of the lawsuit.2 
The results of this study show that firms at higher risk of litigation have lower credit ratings, are more 
likely to be rated speculative grade, pay higher yields on debt, and are less likely to issue debt, 
everything else constant. As litigation risk increases, credit ratings decline and the cost of debt 
increases. At the time of the lawsuit resolution, settlement costs have a significant effect on the cost of 
debt. Companies facing larger settlement disbursements in relation to their available cash experience a 
larger decline in credit ratings and a greater increase in yield spread. I also find that the effect of 
litigation risk and large settlements on cost of debt and debt issuance is stronger for low credit quality 
firms. The results of this study suggests that litigation affects a firm's creditworthiness and cost of debt 
in two stages, first when litigation risk develops and then at the time of the resolution of the lawsuit. 
The results of this study are also economically significant. For instance, increasing the litigation 
probability variable from its 25th to its 75th percentile while retaining all other variables at their 
medians, decreases the probability of being rated investment grade from 51.4% to 39.7% and increases 
the yield spread by 18 basis points. 
Omitted variables that could affect both a firm's credit quality and litigation risk might potentially have 
an endogenous effect on their relation. There is even the possibility of reverse causality between the 
incidence of litigation and cost of debt (or credit ratings). To control for these potential endogeneity 
issues, I apply a two-stage simultaneous equation model similar to the methodology used by Lowry and 
Shu (2002) and Kini et al. (2017). This test helps dispel endogeneity concerns and shows a causal 
relationship between litigation risk and cost of debt. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the 
sample selection requirements and variables. Section 4 provides summary statistics and the results of 
the univariate analysis. Section 5 presents the multivariate analysis results. Section 6 presents the 
simultaneous equation analysis and other robustness tests. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Hypotheses 
Settlements and attorneys’ fees often represent significant direct costs for corporations with negative 
implications on corporate profits and value. Arena and Julio (2015) report an average settlement 
amount of $56 million for companies that disclose settlement costs in their sample. Even though many 
firms buy litigation insurance, as reported by the Towers Perrin Directors and Officers Liability Surveys, 
publicly traded firms have an average litigation insurance limit under $20 million, which does not cover 
for the full direct costs of litigation in most cases. 
Besides direct costs, companies also face indirect costs of litigation that often affect a firm's debt and 
equity value more than direct costs. Indirect costs include an increase in the perceived uncertainty 
about the firms’ prospects by investors, a reduction in firm's prestige, loss in the number of customers 
and suppliers, and diversion of managers’ time and resources (Engelmann and Cornell, 1988, Karpoff 
and Lott, 1993, Karpoff et al., 2008). 
Due to these costs which have a significant effect on profitability and firm's value, debtholders are 
negatively affected by lawsuits and are likely to take into consideration litigation risk at the origination 
of the debt issue. Debtholders, therefore, might require a higher interest rate to offset the perceived 
litigation risk, everything else constant. Similarly, credit rating agencies are likely to include litigation 
risk in their assessment of the credit worthiness of the borrowing firm as a decline in profitability and 
firm value due to litigation has a direct effect on default risk. Bradley and Chen (2011) show that, when 
corporate directors are better protected by limited liability and indemnification provisions from 
possible lawsuits, firms enjoy higher credit ratings and lower yield spreads. Yuan and Zhang (2015) and 
Deng et al. (2016) find that companies with higher risk of class action litigation and after the filing of a 
litigation experience higher interest on their bank loans. 
Hypothesis 1a 
Firms at higher risk of litigation have lower credit ratings, everything else constant. 
Hypothesis 1b 
Firms at higher risk of litigation are more likely to be rated speculative grade, everything else constant. 
Hypothesis 2 
Higher litigation risk significantly increases a firm's cost of debt. 
If litigation risk is likely to have a significant impact on cost of debt, firms that are more exposed to 
lawsuits are likely to reduce their reliance on debt financing. While there is no previous study on the 
effect of litigation risk on debt financing, Autore et al. (2014) show that, following severe lawsuits for 
which they incurred large costs, firms are less likely to seek external debt financing ex post. 
Hypothesis 3 
Firms at higher risk of litigation are less likely to rely on external debt financing, everything else 
constant. 
The effects of litigation on corporate financing policy are long lasting. Firms tend to reduce their 
financing activities following costly lawsuits (Autore et al., 2014). Litigation risk affects firm value and 
firm financial policies due to managers’ and stakeholders’ expectations about future litigation costs. 
However, the full implications of litigation on firm value and liquidity are only known at the time of the 
lawsuit resolution. Arena and Julio (2016) show that litigation risk affects how firms design their payout 
policy. Corporations modify their payout policy when the lawsuit is resolved and the direct costs of 
litigation are incurred. If settlement costs in comparison to cash in hand are higher than anticipated, 
credit ratings therefore might decline and cost of debt might increase incrementally over the changes 
that took place at the time that the litigation risk was initially perceived. Moreover, if disclosed 
settlement costs are higher than expected firms will face additional reputational costs, which could 
further depress credit ratings and elevate debt financing costs. 
Hypothesis 4 
At the time of the lawsuit resolution, settlement costs have a significant negative effect on credit 
ratings and a significant positive effect of a firm's cost of debt. This effect is more pronounced for firms 
with smaller cash reserves in relation to settlement disbursements. 
3. Sample formation and variables 
3.1. Sample 
The initial sample consists of the entire population of Compustat firms from 2000 to 2013 with no 
missing data for the financial statement variables used in the analysis. I match this initial sample with 
the CRSP database to retrieve stock data and exclude firms that CRSP does not cover. As in similar 
studies, utility and financial firms are excluded from the sample. I then merge this sample with 
corporate lawsuits retrieved from the Audit Analytics – Corporate Litigation database. The coverage 
provided by this dataset begins in 2000 and reports information on federal civil lawsuits with U.S. 
publicly-traded firms as defendants. Audit Analytics collects information from corporate disclosures, 
corporate newswires, and from legal disclosures, registrations and legal opinions filed with the SEC. 
The most common types of corporate lawsuits are security class action lawsuits, followed by products 
liability, copyright and patent, antitrust and trade regulation litigations. This litigation dataset contains 
information about the type of lawsuit, lawsuit filing dates, beginning and ending of each class period, 
type of resolution and settlement costs when available. The final sample containing firm 
characteristics, litigation information and credit ratings consists of 13,326 observations. 
For the analysis about cost of debt, I merge this database with Thomson One-Banker (SDC Global 
Issues) to retrieve information about debt issue types, principal amount, maturity, and yield. Because 
many firms place debt securities with the same characteristics within a limited period, I aggregate 
similar issues by a firm within each year as in Denis and Mihov (2003). The principal of the aggregated 
debt is the sum of the principals of the single debt issues, while the maturity of the aggregated debt is 
the weighted average of the maturities of the single issues. The resulting debt cost database consists of 
12,604 observations. 
3.2. Variables 
I measure litigation risk, one of the main independent variables of this study, using a variety of 
approaches. The first proxy of litigation risk, Lawsuit dummy, is an indicator variable equal to one for 
the firms involved in a litigation event in the following year and zero otherwise as in Lowry and 
Shu (2002) and Arena and Julio (2015). The second litigation risk proxy, Litigation risk, is a measure of 
ex ante litigation risk obtained by modeling the probability of being brought into litigation as a function 
of firm characteristics and stock performance variables that have been demonstrated to be related to 
litigation risk in the literature. The probit regression includes many of the variables used in the 
litigation risk estimation models of Kim and Skinner (2012) and Gande and Lewis (2009), such as stock 
return, stock volatility, and industry-specific indicator variables. To avoid the parameter identification 
problem, the litigation risk probit model of this study does not include any of the variables used in the 
main multivariate analysis. Appendix B reports the results of this probit regression. The third proxy, 
Industry litigation risk, is an industry measure of litigation risk calculated as the number of lawsuits 
filed each year against firms in the same three-digit SIC industry divided by the total number of firms in 
that industry.3 
The other litigation variables relate to the outcome of the lawsuit. Ln settlement is the logarithm of the 
settlement amount plus one. The addition of one to the settlement amount allows the inclusion of 
lawsuits resolved with a dismissal for which the settlement amount is equal to zero. Settlement cash, is 
calculated as the settlement dollar amount paid by the defendant firm at the time of the resolution of 
the lawsuit, divided by cash and short-term securities. Having cash in the denominator allow for an 
estimation of the effective cost of the settlement as firms with lower quantities of cash at hand are 
more severely affected by a lawsuit settlement. The Settlement dummy is set to one for lawsuits 
resolved in a settlement and zero for lawsuits resolved in favor of the defendant firms with either a 
dismissal, withdrawal, or a favorable jury verdict. Finally, Insufficient cash is an indicator variable equal 
to one if the settlement costs exceed the firm's cash holdings, and zero otherwise. 
I construct the main credit rating variable as in Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) and Arena (2011) by 
converting credit ratings into numerical scores (i.e., 7 for AAA rating, 6 for AA ratings, 5 for A ratings, 
etc.). I also generate an investment grade indicator variable equal to one if the firm is rated investment 
grade (BBB- or better) and zero otherwise. 
The cost of debt variable, as in Arena and Dewally (2012), is calculated as the weighted average of the 
yield spread of corporate bonds and bank loans on the issuance year (bps over the Treasury security of 
comparable maturity). 
The control variables are firm characteristics that previous studies find related to credit rating and cost 
of debt: total assets, net leverage, profitability, a net loss indicator variable, fixed assets, capital 
expenditures, and Altman's Z (e.g., Kaplan and Urwitz, 1979). The cost of debt regressions contains also 
the debt issue specific control variables maturity and deal size which are averaged annually for each 
firm. Appendix A provides a descriptions of all the variables. 
4. Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Panel A of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for firm, deal, and lawsuit variables. Debt issues have 
an average (median) principal of is $ 657 M ($ 300 M), an average (median) maturity of 6.35 years (5 
years) and an average (median) spread over the yield of a treasury security of similar maturity of 2.02 
% (1.63%). The average of the lawsuit dummy is 0.09, which implies that on average 9% of our sample 
firms are sued each year. Some firms in our sample are sued more than once per year as the average of 
the number of lawsuits per firm per year is 0.13. The average probability of getting sued, as measured 
by litigation risk, is 0.09. The average industry litigation risk is 0.17. About 38% percent of lawsuits for 
which resolution data is available terminate with a settlement. The rest are resolved in favor of the 
defendant firm usually through withdrawal or dismissal. The average (median) settlement amount for 
lawsuits that have reached a resolution by the end of 2014 is $ 192 M ($ 15 M). The average (median) 
settlement divided by the firm's cash holding is 3.20 (0.12).4 The average (median) time that lapses 
from the date of the lawsuit filing to the lawsuit resolution (settlement, dismissal, withdrawal, or 
resolved in favor of the defendant firm) is 1.48 (1.10). The large reduction in sample size for the 
settlement data can be explained by the fact that the settlement paid by the defendant firm to the 
plaintiffs is not publicly disclosed in several cases. Moreover, many of the lawsuits filed towards the 
end of the sample period were not resolved yet at the time of the data collection. 
  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
Panel A – Variables descriptive statistics  
Mean Median St Dev N 
Total assets 4235.40 345.84 20,998.88 13,326 
Leverage 0.19 0.13 0.30 13,326 
ROA 0.02 0.03 0.88 13,326 
Sales growth 0.03 0.05 1.22 13,326 
Market-to-book 2.12 1.49 2.98 13,326 
Altman's Z 6.67 2.59 16.56 13,326 
Credit rating 3.44 3.00 1.19 12,604 
Debt principal 657.32 300.00 1409.00 12,604 
Debt maturity 6.35 5.00 8.24 12,604 
Yield spread 202.24 162.50 166.77 13,046 
Lawsuit dummy 0.09 0.00 0.28 13,326 
N lawsuits 0.13 0.00 0.51 13,326 
N outstanding lawsuits 0.42 0.00 1.26 13,326 
Litigation Risk 0.09 0.06 0.09 13,326 
Industry Litigation risk 0.17 0.14 0.19 13,326 
Settlement dummy 0.36 0.00 0.21 2269 
Settlement 191.73 15.00 484.58 2269 
Settlement cash 3.20 0.12 32.36 2269 
Years to resolution 1.48 1.10 2.56 2269 
Panel B: Correlation between litigation proxies  
Lawsuit dummy Litigation risk Industry litigation risk 
 









   
(0.000) 
 




Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the firm, deal, and lawsuit variables used throughout the study. 
Panel B presents the correlation between the three litigation proxies. p-values are reported in parenthesis. 
 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between the three proxies of litigation 
risk used in the study. While the three variables are significantly correlated, their correlation 
coefficients are all below 0.4, which confirms that the three proxies capture in part different 
dimensions of litigation risk. 
Table 2 presents a univariate analysis of the effect of a lawsuit filing and lawsuit outcomes on the 
defendant firm's credit rating and yield spread. Panel A of Table 2 shows no significant difference in 
credit rating and spread between firms sued in the year of the lawsuit filing and firms not sued. 
However, both the mean and the median of the annual change in credit rating and yield spread are 
significantly different at the 10% or 5% level between sued and not sued firms. Specifically, in the year 
of the lawsuit filing the credit rating of the sued firm declines significantly more than for the non-sued 
control firm while the yield spread increase significantly more. 
  
Table 2. Lawsuit initiation, lawsuit resolution, and debt characteristics. 
Panel A: Lawsuit filing and debt characteristics  
Lawsuit dummy = 0 Lawsuit dummy = 1 t-test Wilcoxon  
Mean Median Mean Median p-value p-value 
Credit rating 3.55 3 3.84 4 .534 .259 
Δ Credit rating −0.06 0 −0.10 0 .072 .095 
Spread 206.11 164.33 192.42 160.80 .653 .782 
Δ Spread 10.27 0 22.32 0 .039 .089 
Panel B: Lawsuit resolution and debt characteristics  
Lawsuit dismissed Defendant settled t-test Wilcoxon  
Mean Median Mean Median p-value p-value 
Credit rating 3.87 4 3.76 4 .534 .259 
Δ Credit rating −0.01 0 −0.07 0 .056 .096 
Spread 142.54 121.55 214.56 179.52 .115 .135 
Δ Spread −10.65 0 19.76 0 .054 .098 
This table presents univariate statistics for credit ratings and yield spread segmented by litigation events. Panel 
A presents mean, median, the p-value of the t-test of the difference of the mean, and of the Wilcoxon test for 
credit rating, change in credit rating, yield spread, and change in yield spread between firm-year observations at 
the time a lawsuit is filed and firm not subject to a lawsuit. Panel B presents mean, median, the p-value of the t-
test of the difference of the mean and of the Wilcoxon test for credit rating, change in credit rating, yield spread, 
and change in yield spread between firm-year observations for the group of defendant firms that have their 
lawsuit dismissed or withdrawn and a group of firms that settle with the lawsuit plaintiffs. We calculate the 
change in credit rating as the credit rating in the year before the lawsuit filing (or lawsuit resolution) and the 
year after. We calculate the change in yield spread as the difference in spread of the debt issuance preceding 
the lawsuit filing (or lawsuit resolution) and the one following it. 
Panel B of Table 2 presents analogous results by examining credit ratings and spread at the time of the 
lawsuit resolution. While the level of credit ratings and spread is not significantly different for 
defendant firms having their lawsuit dismissed versus firms settling with the plaintiffs, the difference is 
statistically significant for the change in credit rating and yield spread. The change in credit rating 
between the year before and the year of the lawsuit resolution is significantly more negative for firms 
that settle. Moreover, firms that settle experience an increase in yield spread from the previous year. 
Conversely, firms that see their lawsuit dismissed or withdrawn benefit from a decline in yield spread 
from the year before. The mean and median difference in the change of yield spread between these 
two groups of firm is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Table 3 presents credit ratings and yield spread by litigation risk and settlement quintiles. Quintiles 1 
and 5 consist of firms in the lowest and highest litigation risk quintiles, respectively. Panel A of Table 3 
shows that firms at higher risk of litigation have significantly lower credit ratings and higher yield 
spread. Even though firms at higher risk of litigation accumulate more cash in anticipation of future 
settlement costs (Arena and Julio, 2015), litigation risk has a negative effect of firms’ creditworthiness 
even before controlling for other factors affecting it. These results provide preliminary support to 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
  
Table 3. Litigation risk, settlement costs, and debt characteristics. 
Panel A: Litigation risk quintiles  
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q5-Q1 Q5-Q1 (p-value) 
Credit rating 4.47 4.03 3.55 3.18 2.75 −1.72 (.050) 
Spread 148.75 172.53 203.56 227.49 253.51 104.76 (.058) 
Panel B: Industry litigation risk quintiles  
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q5-Q1 Q5-Q1 
Credit rating 3.70 3.72 3.60 3.74 3.83 0.13 (.911) 
Spread 199.99 208.73 219.11 199.22 197.69 −2.30 (.892) 
Panel C: Settlement cash quintiles  
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q5-Q1 Q5-Q1 
Credit rating 4.03 4.38 3.95 3.85 2.90 −1.13 (.052) 
Spread 148.98 145.31 170.36 187.31 260.47 111.49 (.037) 
Δ Credit rating −0.02 −0.08 −0.08 −0.08 −0.11 −0.09 (.048) 
Δ Spread −10.8 −15.61 14.03 37.71 31.17 41.97 (.045) 
This table presents the average credit ratings and yield spreads by quintiles. Panel A segments the sample by 
litigation risk quintiles from the lowest (Q1) to the highest (Q5). Panel B segments the sample by industry 
litigation risk quintiles. Panel C segments the sample by settlement cash quintiles at the time of the lawsuit 
resolution. The last two columns present the difference of the averages between the fifth and first quintile and 
the p-value of the t-statistics of the difference, respectively. 
Panel B of Table 3 does not show a significant difference across litigation risk quintiles for credit ratings 
and spread when litigation risk is measured at the industry level. Panels C shows the distribution of 
credit ratings and yield spread by settlement cash quintiles. Credit ratings are significantly lower for 
firms that settle for the largest amount compared to their level of cash holdings than for firms that do 
not provide any monetary compensation to the plaintiffs (quintile 5 versus quintile 1). Contrary to 
litigation risk, settlement costs are associated with a time-specific event, the resolution of a lawsuit. 
The last two rows of Panel C show the change in credit ratings around the year of the settlement. The 
difference in the decrease in credit ratings in the year of the lawsuit resolution from the preceding year 
is statistically significant between quintile 5 and quintile 1. The results are also significant for yield 
spread. The yield spread is significantly higher and increases from the previous year for firms in the 
highest settlement quintile versus firms in the lowest settlement quintile. The results of Panel C of 
Table 3 provide preliminary evidence consistent with Hypothesis 3. 
5. Multivariate analysis 
The multivariate analysis consists of tests on the effect of litigation risk on the level of firm credit 
ratings, the change in credit ratings, the yield spread level, and the change in spread. I also investigate 
the effect of lawsuit outcomes on credit ratings and cost of debt. 
5.1. Litigation risk and credit ratings 
Panel A of Table 4 presents the results of ordered logistic regressions with the credit rating numerical 
variable as dependent variable. Each of the three regression specifications includes one of the three 
proxies of litigation risk. The regressions also include control variables related to credit ratings as 
described in Section 3.2. All three proxies for litigation risk are negative and significant after controlling 
for corporate characteristics that affect firm credit ratings. Firms at higher risk of litigation are rated 
lower by credit rating agencies, ceteris paribus. This result has also strong economic significance. If the 
litigation probability in the second specification of Table 4 increases from its 25th to its 75th percentile, 
while retaining all other variables at their median values, the predicted percentage of firms rated A 
decreases from 8.61% to 6.87%, the percentage of firms rated BBB declines from 41.1% to 36.8%, while 
the percentage of being rated BB or B rises from 41.5% to 45.6% and from 7.9% to 10.0% respectively. 
This result provides strong support for Hypothesis 1. The sign and significance of the control variables 
is consistent with the extant literature on firm credit ratings determinants (e.g., Kaplan and 
Urwitz, 1979). Larger firms with lower leverage, higher profitability, lower market-to-book, more fixed 
assets, fewer capital expenditures, and a higher Altman's Z score benefit from higher credit ratings. 
Table 4. Litigation risk and credit ratings. 
Panel A: Credit ratings  
(1) (2) (3)  
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Lawsuit dummy −0.1402 .098 





Industry litigation risk 
    
−0.8005 .000 
Ln assets 0.0426 .212 0.1372 .001 0.0338 0.322 
Ln marketcap 1.0057 .000 1.0072 .000 1.0287 .000 
Net leverage −2.4102 .000 −2.5553 .000 −2.4032 .000 
ROA 1.5051 .000 1.5664 .000 1.4443 .000 
Market-to-book −0.0661 .003 0.0251 .401 −0.0649 .004 
Loss −1.1553 .000 −1.0919 .000 −1.1325 .000 
Fixed assets 0.4848 .000 0.4031 .000 0.4576 .000 
Cap ex −4.6440 .000 −4.8124 .000 −4.6653 .000 
Altman's Z 0.0152 .082 0.0176 .075 0.0165 .071 
Obs 13,326 12,598 13,326 
Generalized R2 0.456 0.489 0.478 
Panel B: Investment versus speculative grade  
(1) (2) (3)  
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Lawsuit dummy −0.2056 .005 





Industry litigation risk 
    
−1.0863 .000 
Ln assets 0.0190 .774 0.1166 .107 0.0025 .970 
Ln marketcap 1.2463 .000 1.3715 .000 1.2726 .000 
Leverage −3.6693 .000 −3.7772 .000 −3.6598 .000 
ROA 2.8596 .000 2.8840 .000 2.8505 .000 
Market-to-book −0.2504 .000 −0.2052 .000 −0.2525 .000 
Loss −1.0115 .000 −0.8847 .000 −0.9892 .000 
Fixed assets 1.1734 .000 1.0290 .000 1.1401 .000 
Cap ex −8.3284 .000 −9.3305 .000 −8.3066 .000 
Altman's Z 0.0168 .071 0.0179 .070 0.0198 .058 
Intercept −8.9200 .000 −10.1741 .000 −8.8321 .000 
Obs 13,326 12,598 13,326 
Generalized R2 0.4686 0.4753 0.4725 
This table presents multivariate tests about the relation between litigation risk and credit ratings, Panel A 
presents ordered logistic regressions with the credit rating numerical variable as the dependent variable. Panel B 
presents logistic regressions with a dependent indicator variable equal to one when a firm is rated investment 
grade, and zero when it is rated speculative grade. All variables are described in appendix. The regressions 
include year fixed effects. Statistically significant coefficients are reported in bold. 
The results on the relation between litigation risk and the credit rating grade reported in Panel B of 
Table 4 present an analogous picture. The test consists of logistic regressions with a dependent 
indicator variable equal to one if the firm is rated investment grade and zero otherwise. All three 
proxies for litigation risk are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The relation between 
litigation risk and the credit rating grade has also strong economic significance. Increasing the litigation 
probability in the second specification of Panel B of Table 4 from its 25th to its 75th percentile while 
retaining all other variables at their medians, decreases the percentage of firms rated investment 
grade from 51.4% to 39.7%. All the control variables with the exclusion of the logarithm of assets are 
statistically significant and assume the sign consistent with the results presented in previous studies 
that analyze the relation between firm characteristics and credit ratings. 
In addition to examining the effect of litigation risk on the level of a firm's credit rating, it is important 
to investigate the effect of the filing of a lawsuit or the change in litigation risk on a possible 
downgrade or upgrade in credit rating. Kisgen (2006) shows that corporate financial policies such as 
capital structure decisions are significantly influenced by the possibility of a rating downgrade or 
upgrade. The possible effect of litigation risk on changes in credit ratings can have therefore important 
implications on financial policies set by corporations. 
Table 5 present the results of ordered logistic regressions that analyze the effect of a lawsuit filing or 
the change of litigation risk on possible credit rating changes when controlling for changes in firm 
characteristics from the previous year. The dependent indicator variable assumes the value of −1 when 
a firms is downgraded to a lower credit rating from the previous year, 0 if it maintains the same credit 
rating as the previous year, and +1 if it upgraded to a higher credit rating from the previous year. All 
the independent variables with the exception of Lawsuit dummy are calculated as the difference 
between the current and previous year values. The first specification of Table 5 shows that the filing of 
a lawsuit is significantly associated with a credit rating downgrade for the defendant firm. The second 
and third specification of Table 5 show that an increase in litigation risk either measured at the firm or 
industry level is significantly related to a credit rating downgrade. Increasing litigation probability from 
its 25th to its 75th percentile while keeping all other variables at their median increase the predicted 
probability of a downgrade from 8.4% to 10.1% while decreases the probability of an upgrade from 
7.3% to 6.1%. 
  
Table 5. Litigation risk change and credit rating upgrade/downgrade. 
 
(1) (2) (3)  
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Lawsuit dummy −0.1248 .068 
    




Δ Industry litigation risk 
    
−0.2759 .012 
Δ Ln assets 0.5560 .000 0.6260 .000 0.5637 .000 
Δ Ln marketcap 0.9107 .000 0.8967 .000 0.9142 .000 
Δ Leverage −2.4325 .000 −3.0547 .000 −2.4445 .000 
Δ ROA 0.1043 .623 0.0194 .937 0.1075 .614 
Δ Market-to-book −0.0610 .099 −0.1052 .060 −0.0578 .117 
Δ Loss −0.4434 .000 −0.4609 .000 −0.4392 .000 
Δ Fixed assets 0.0379 .884 0.0625 .819 0.0500 .848 
Δ Cap ex −1.2364 .150 −1.4425 .178 −1.2554 .165 
Δ Altman's Z 0.0002 .371 0.0002 .370 0.0002 .361 
Obs 9806 9270 9806 
Generalized R2 0.402 0.414 0.407 
This table presents ordered logistic regressions with a dependent indicator variable equal to −1 when a firm is 
downgraded to a lower credit rating from the previous year, 0 if it maintains the same credit rating as the 
previous year, and +1 if it is upgraded to a higher credit rating from the previous year. All independent variables 
aside from the lawsuit dummy are the difference between the current and previous year values. All variables are 
described in the appendix. The regressions include year fixed effects. Statistical significant coefficients are 
reported in bold. 
5.2. Litigation risk and cost of debt 
Table 6 presents the results of year fixed effect regressions with the average spread of all debt issued 
annually by each firm as the dependent variable. In addition to the control variables contained in the 
regressions presented in the previous multivariate tables, these cost of debt regressions include also 
the logarithm of the debt principal and the logarithm of the debt maturity. 
Table 6. Litigation risk and yield spread. 
 
(1) (2) (3)  
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Lawsuit dummy 16.4226 .095 





Industry litigation Risk 
    
34.8889 .000 
Ln assets 21.9425 .774 19.8503 .107 21.1466 .970 
Ln marketcap −40.1076 .000 −41.3180 .000 −40.5814 .000 
Leverage 201.9057 .000 208.2030 .000 204.3611 .000 
ROA −18.5625 .000 −12.3463 .000 −14.7271 .000 
Market-to-book −3.3277 .000 −6.7315 .000 −3.8697 .000 
Loss 64.3653 .000 63.8128 .000 63.2795 .000 
Fixed assets −5.1072 .000 −3.7518 .000 −4.5569 .000 
Cap ex 76.1127 .000 96.6928 .000 78.8885 .000 
Altman's Z 0.0003 .494 0.0004 .380 0.0003 .488 
Ln principal 5.2432 .043 6.2356 .041 5.7635 .049 
Ln maturity −2.4343 .124 −2.1554 .234 −2.5432 .165 
Intercept 269.9882 .000 290.1838 .000 274.5672 .000 
Obs 12,604 11,905 12,604 
Adjusted R2 0.3355 0.3972 0.3741 
This table presents OLS regressions with the basis point yield spread as dependent variable. All variables are 
described in the appendix. The regressions include year fixed effects. Statistical significant coefficients are 
reported in bold. 
All three proxies of litigation risk have a positive and significant coefficient. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 3, companies at higher risk of litigation sustain higher debt costs, everything else constant. 
Consistent with previous studies on the determinants of cost of debt, companies with higher leverage, 
lower profitability, lower market-to-book, fewer fixed assets, larger capital expenditures, and firms 
posting a loss bear a larger cost of debt. The results are also economically significant. In the year 
preceding a lawsuit, firms have a 16 basis point higher yield spread than firms that are not sued, 
everything else constant. Increasing litigation risk from its 25th to its 75th percentile, while keeping all 
other independent variables at their median, increases yield spread by 18 basis points from 175 to 193 
basis points. 
The results presented in Table 6 show that litigation risk is a significant determinant of cost of debt. 
According to Hypothesis 2, the change in litigation risk due to the filing of a new lawsuit or to a change 
in firm characteristics that underline risk of litigation, or to a change in the number of industry 
competitors facing lawsuits should cause a change in the cost of debt. I test this possibility by 
estimating regressions with change in spread as the dependent variable. The control variables of these 
regressions are the change in firm characteristics between the current and previous year. Table 7 
presents the results. A change of litigation risk at the firm level, measured either with the Litigation 
dummy or a change in the Litigation risk variable has a significant effect on an increase on yield spread. 
A sued firm experience an increase in yield spread of 19 points over a firm that is not sued. This result 
supports Hypothesis 2. A change in industry litigation risk is instead not significantly related to a 
change in spread. 
Table 7. Change in litigation risk and yield spread. 
 
(1) (2) (3)  
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Lawsuit dummy 18.5140 .000 
    




Δ Industry litigation risk 
    
15.1676 .157 
Δ Ln assets 27.5790 .017 32.5540 .008 29.4429 .011 
Δ Ln marketcap −66.6494 .000 −66.0436 .000 −65.8219 .000 
Δ Leverage 164.9215 .000 181.1192 .000 163.8228 .000 
Δ ROA 48.4190 .122 51.0210 .140 47.8018 .127 
Δ Market-to-book 4.8355 .420 3.5603 .583 5.2151 .385 
Δ Loss 27.2618 .000 26.7485 .000 27.7137 .000 
Δ Fixed assets 23.2204 .245 22.6784 .278 26.8542 .178 
Δ Cap ex 279.6883 .000 267.9661 .000 278.9202 .000 
Δ Altman's Z −0.0001 .370 −0.0001 .367 −0.0001 .360 
Δ Ln principal 7.3634 .065 8.5474 .049 7.3643 .068 
Δ Ln maturity −3.5733 .145 −3.5675 .221 −3.5454 .163 
Intercept 25.1596 .000 21.7783 .000 21.3573 .000 
Obs 8801 8524 8801 
Generalized R2 0.305 0.312 0.274 
This table presents regressions with the change in yield spread as dependent variable. We calculate the change 
in spread as the difference of the average spread of debt issued in the lawsuit year and the average spread of 
debt issued in the year before. All independent variables aside from the lawsuit dummy are the difference 
between the current and previous year values. All variables are described in the appendix. The regressions 
include year fixed effects. Statistical significant coefficients are reported in bold. 
5.3. Litigation risk and debt issuance 
The expectation of future lawsuits, which causes a decline in credit ratings and increase in debt costs as 
shown in the previous section, is likely to affect a firm's decision on issuing debt for investment or 
operating needs. I test this conjecture by estimating logistic regressions with a dependent indicator 
variable equal to one in the year a firm issues debt and zero otherwise. In addition to the control 
variables that are present in the other regressions of this study, the debt issuance logistic regressions 
include an equity issuance variable to control for the alternative use of equity as a form of corporate 
financing. 
Table 8 presents the results of these regressions. The coefficients of all three proxies of litigation risk 
are negative and significant. This result shows that, consistent with Hypothesis 3, firms at higher risk of 
litigation are less likely to issue debt, everything else constant. The coefficients of the control variables 
show that larger, more leveraged, less profitable firms with larger capital expenditures are more likely 
to issue debt. Firms that issue more equity are less likely to issue debt, ceteris paribus. 
Table 8. Litigation risk and debt issuance. 
 
(1) (2) (3)  
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Lawsuit dummy −0.2239 .000 





Industry litigation risk 
    
−0.1901 .069 
Ln assets 0.1420 .000 0.1498 .000 0.0931 .000 
Ln marketcap −0.0058 .741 0.0033 .873 0.0454 .141 
Leverage 2.3125 .000 2.1692 .000 2.2200 .000 
ROA −0.1687 .000 −0.1269 .003 −0.1298 .000 
Market-to-book −0.0240 .008 −0.0262 .044 −0.0780 .000 
Loss −0.0047 .869 0.0222 .483 0.0263 .411 
Fixed assets −0.6646 .000 −0.7253 .000 −0.6750 .000 
Cap ex 7.7100 .000 8.0611 .000 7.9294 .000 
Altman's Z −0.0015 .000 −0.0023 .000 −0.0022 .000 
Equity issuance −0.4212 .000 −0.4014 .000 −0.3300 .000 
Intercept −1.9459 .000 −1.9596 .000 −1.8943 .000 
Obs 13,326 12,598 13,326 
Pseudo R2 0.5112 0.5123 0.4877 
This table presents logistic regressions with a dependent indicator variable equal to 1 in the year firm issues 
debt and zero otherwise. All variables are described in the appendix. The regressions include year fixed effects. 
Statistical significant coefficients are reported in bold. 
The litigation risk proxies have also strong economic significance. Increasing Litigation risk from its 25th 
to its 75th percentile while keeping all other independent variables at their median, for instance, 
decreases the probability for a firm to issue debt by 16%.5 
5.4. Lawsuit outcome, credit ratings, and cost of debt 
A portion of corporate lawsuits are based on frivolous matters and are often dismissed or withdrawn. 
By analyzing the lawsuit outcome, it is possible to isolate the effect of larger lawsuits with significant 
effect on the defendant firms from frivolous lawsuits and measure their effect on credit ratings and 
cost of debt. I analyze the effect of lawsuit outcome on corporate debt characteristics by focusing on 
the amount of cash that companies have to disburse to settle the lawsuit divided by their cash holdings 
in the previous fiscal year. This measure reflects the more severe impact that settlement costs have on 
firms with lower amounts of cash reserves readily available to pay plaintiffs. The most common 
resolutions for the lawsuits in the sample are settlements, withdrawals or dismissals. As in Arena and 
Julio (2015), no class action security lawsuit, the most common form of corporate lawsuit in the U.S., is 
fully litigated in court. In some occasions, other types of corporate civil lawsuits are fully litigated in 
court and reach a jury verdict. The settlement variable in the paper reports settlement amounts when 
a settlement is reached out of court and in the rare occasions that a jury verdict is reached against the 
defendant firm, the settlement observation reports the monetary damages reported in the jury 
verdict. If, in a given year, a firm settles more than one lawsuit, I compute the sum of all the settlement 
amounts for that year. Both Settlement Cash and Ln settlement assume the value of zero if all the 
lawsuits that are resolved in a given year for a defendant firm terminate with dismissals or are 
withdrawn. The only litigation cost considered in this test consists of settlement payments or damages. 
Firms face also other significant litigation costs for which there is no data availability, such as attorney's 
fees and indirect costs. If anything, limiting this analysis to settlement costs underplays the total costs 
faced by the firm. 
Panel A of Table 9 presents regressions that analyze the effect of Settlement cash and Ln settlement on 
the magnitude of the change in credit rating, an upgrade or downgrade in rating, and a change in yield 
spread from the previous year. The two settlement variables are concurrently included in the 
specification to measure two different effects of the settlement announcement. Ln settlement proxy 
for the overall severity of the resolution and the possible readjustment of litigation risk. Settlement 
cash on the other hand measures more directly the effect of litigation costs on credit ratings and debt 
costs as the variable assumes larger values for companies with low level of cash holdings in relation to 
the settlement costs. Settlement cash has a negative and statistically significant coefficient in all 
specifications. Consistent with Hypothesis 4 companies that face larger settlements when compared to 
their cash holdings experience a decline in credit ratings and an increase in yield spread. 
Table 9. Lawsuit settlements and debt. 
Panel A: Settlement amount and debt characteristics  
Change in rating Upgrade/downgrade Spread change  
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Settlement cash −0.0093 .043 −0.0197 .073 2.2126 .071 
Ln settlement 0.0038 .579 0.0144 .689 5.9037 .060 
Δ Ln assets 0.0852 .294 0.4566 .269 42.3411 .333 
Δ Ln marketcap 0.2397 .000 1.0938 .000 −29.6126 .241 
Δ Leverage −0.6526 .000 −3.2444 .000 158.4048 .018 
Δ ROA 0.2667 .0976 1.6872 .034 −169.4451 .076 
Δ Market-to-book −0.0264 .315 −0.1389 .287 11.3503 .575 
Δ Loss −0.0521 .074 −0.1692 .376 −17.2409 .412 
Δ Fixed assets 0.0690 .737 0.5793 .571 −69.2473 .496 
Δ Cap ex 1.4314 .206 6.7823 .205 170.2072 .580 
Δ Altman's Z −0.0001 .254 −0.0008 .173 0.0027 .537 
Obs 1938 1938 1373 
Generalized or Adjusted R2 0.314 0.295 0.223 
Panel B: Cash poor firms, lawsuit outcome, and debt characteristics  
Change in rating Upgrade/downgrade Spread change  
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Insufficient cash −0.1550 .047 −0.7715 .041 29.1220 .085 
Settlement dummy −0.0383 .147 −0.1646 .241 22.7151 .044 
Δ Ln assets 0.0893 .271 0.4753 .250 38.7155 .376 
Δ Ln marketcap 0.2391 .000 1.0861 .000 −29.2347 .246 
Δ Leverage −0.6529 .000 −3.2489 .000 157.1393 .019 
Δ ROA 0.2765 .095 1.7420 .030 −160.5121 .083 
Δ Market-to-book −0.0255 .331 −0.1323 .311 10.2203 .614 
Δ Loss −0.0536 .162 −0.1804 .346 −18.4117 .378 
Δ Fixed assets 0.0765 .710 0.5917 .563 −71.3536 .483 
Δ Cap ex 1.4083 .266 6.7116 .276 161.4849 .600 
Δ Altman's Z −0.0001 .276 −0.0007 .193 0.0027 .546 
Obs 1938 1938 1373 
Generalized or Adjusted R2 0.245 0.276 0.251 
This table presents regressions measuring the change in debt characteristics due to lawsuit outcomes. Panel A 
presents regressions measuring the change in debt characteristics due to settlement amounts in relation to firm 
liquidity. Panel B presents regressions measuring the change in debt characteristics in relation to the type of 
resolution (settlement or dismissal) and whether the defendant firm has enough cash to cover lawsuit costs. In 
both panels the first specification has the change in numerical rating between the year after and the year before 
the settlement as dependent variable. The second specification of both panels is an ordered logit with a 
dependent variable assuming the value of 1 if the rating is upgraded, 0 if the rating dos not change, and −1 f the 
rating is downgraded following the settlement. The third specification of both panels is a regression with the 
dependent variable as the change in yield spread form the debt issue following and the one preceding the 
settlement. All independent variables aside from the lawsuit variables are the difference between the current 
and previous year values. All variables are described in the appendix. The regressions include year fixed effects. 
Statistical significant coefficients are reported in bold. 
The change in rating regression shows that the settlement cash ratio is negative and statistically 
significant suggesting that companies facing larger settlement costs in comparison with their cash in 
hand experience a larger credit rating downgrade, the upgrade/downgrade ordered logit confirms that 
larger settlements are associated with a higher probability of a credit rating downgrade. If the 
settlement cash variable goes from 0 (case of dismissal) to its 75th percentile while retaining all other 
independent variables at the median, the probability of a rating downgrade increases by 12%. 
Companies that experience larger settlement disbursements in comparison to their cash holding level 
also experience a significant increase in the cost of debt. The Settlement cash variable in the change in 
yield spread regression has also strong economic significance. If the settlement cash variable goes from 
0 (case of dismissal) to its 75th percentile while retaining all other independent variables at the 
median, the yield spread increases by 21 basis points. Yield spreads also significantly increase as 
settlement get larger independently from the cash held by the defendant firm. 
Panel B of Table 9 presents similar specifications in which I measure the effect of lawsuit outcomes and 
scarcity of available cash in an alternative way. Insufficient cash measures the firm's ability to cover the 
litigation costs by assuming the value of 1 when the settlement costs are higher than the firm's cash 
holdings, and 0 otherwise. The analysis controls also for the litigation outcome independently of the 
firm's liquidity with the inclusion of Settlement dummy, an indicator equal to 1 when the lawsuits 
resolve into a settlement and 0 when is dismissed or withdrawn. Consistent with the results of Panel A 
and Hypothesis 4, the results of Panel B show that firms with insufficient cash to cover settlement costs 
experience a decline in credit ratings and increase in yield spread. The yield spread significantly 
increase as settlement get larger even controlling for the firm's liquidity. 
6. Additional tests 
6.1. The effect of litigation on corporate debt by firm creditworthiness 
Arena and Julio (2015) show that firms at higher risk of litigation accumulate cash in anticipation of 
large settlement disbursements. Companies in financial distress do not have the ability to save cash 
and therefore are likely to be more affected by litigation than firms in good credit standing. To test this 
conjecture, I split the sample between firms rated investment grade (firms with a rating of BBB- of 
higher) and firms rated speculative grade (firms rated BB+ or lower). Table 10 shows the results.6 For 
the debt issuance regressions, the litigation risk coefficient is negative and significant for both 
subsamples. However, the economic significance is stronger for the speculative grade firms subsample. 
Increasing litigation risk from its 25th to its 75th percentile while keeping all other independent 
variables at their median decreases the probability of an investment-grade firm issuing debt by 7% 
while it decreases the probability of speculative-grade firm issuing debt by 26%. The yield spread 
regressions provide additional evidence of the differential effect of litigation risk on firms with 
different credit quality. The litigation risk coefficient is positive and significantly related to yield spread 
for speculative grade firms but it is not significant for investment-grade firms. Litigation risk is 
significant in the difference in the yield spread regressions for both subsamples but the economic 
significance for the speculative-grade subsample is greater. Finally, the last regression specification 
shows that settlement cash is significantly related to a change in yield spread for speculative-grade 
firms but not for investment-grade firms. Overall, the results presented in Table 10 are consistent with 
the conjecture of litigation risk and litigation costs having a more severe effect on debt issuance 
decisions and debt costs for low credit quality firms. 
Table 10. The Effect of litigation on debt by firm credit worthiness. 
Panel A: Investment grade firms  













      
16.9111 .310 
Ln settlement 
      
12.4402 .002 
Ln assets 0.0341 .738 45.0642 .000 122.2184 .000 68.3867 .302 
Ln marketcap 0.2764 .007 −54.4816 .000 −123.4549 .000 −113.4756 .009 
Leverage 4.3617 .000 58.5845 .000 164.9493 .001 347.8940 .005 
ROA −1.0709 .180 140.9912 .002 −109.7911 .185 304.5066 .122 
Market-to-
book 
−0.1513 .023 0.9058 .808 23.0646 .052 27.2480 .360 
Loss 0.0728 .640 36.7343 .000 28.1839 .044 77.6414 .025 
Fixed assets −0.8830 .000 −9.0672 .102 104.1849 .146 62.8761 .623 
Cap ex 9.1968 .000 −6.7270 .867 82.7736 .598 −93.8923 .849 
Altman's Z −0.0003 .517 −0.0428 .497 0.0494 .608 0.0041 .959 
Equity issuance −3.6255 .000 
      
Intercept −3.6654 .000 182.0679 .000 8.4699 .002 5.9537 .305 
Obs 5246 3956 3155 654 
Pseudo R2 0.354 0.246 0.218 0.112 
Panel B: Speculative grade firms 
 
Debt issuance Yield spread Δ Yield spread Δ Yield spread 
 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Litigation risk −2.4351 .000 130.5074 .001 201.7637 .000 
  
Settlement cash 
      
29.0674 .045 
Ln settlement 
      
11.6244 .092 
Ln assets 0.2869 .000 13.3659 .032 9.1519 .558 66.6112 .474 
Ln marketcap 0.0656 .167 −24.1913 .000 −59.2617 .000 −16.8364 .731 
Leverage 1.4416 .000 136.0262 .000 184.9437 .000 67.7784 .058 
ROA 0.2669 .238 −20.7935 .584 −56.5228 .184 102.8506 .612 
Market-to-book −0.1237 .053 −14.7480 .061 4.2439 .619 34.3958 .563 
Loss 0.1883 .008 53.8549 .000 23.5666 .014 64.9983 .077 
Fixed assets −0.8697 .000 26.5468 .000 0.5429 .983 −53.5441 .503 
Cap ex 9.2150 .000 13.7594 .717 −29.4042 .234 399.0186 .503 
Altman's Z −0.0126 .018 −0.0038 .500 −0.0002 .944 0.0074 .645 
Equity issuance −2.3872 .000 
      
Intercept −3.0983 .000 296.3126 .000 35.1971 .000 35.3296 .065 
Obs 6262 4504 3754 945 
Pseudo R2 0.425 0.348 0.298 0.134 
This table presents debt issuance, yield spread and change in yield spread regressions. The independent 
variables for the change in yield spread regression are the difference between the current and previous year 
values. Panel A presents the regressions estimated on the sub-sample of firms rated investment grade (rating of 
BBB- or higher) while Panel B presents the regressions estimated on the sub-sample of firms rated speculative 
grade (rating of BB+ or lower) . All variables are described in the appendix. The regressions include year fixed 
effects. Statistical significant coefficients are reported in bold. 
6.2. Joint estimation of yield spread and litigation risk 
The results of this study show that litigation risk affects a firm's credit worthiness and cost of debt. It 
could be the case, however, that omitted variables might concurrently affect litigation risk and debt 
characteristics. For example, a defective product could cause operational losses and therefore affect 
the firm creditworthiness while at the same time increase the likelihood of a product liability lawsuit. 
Even if less likely, there could be also the possibility of reverse causality. The main multivariate analysis 
discussed in the previous sections of the paper in part addresses these issues by controlling for several 
variables that affect the firm's creditworthiness and the incidence of litigation. 
In this section I address these endogeneity concerns through a 2SLS simultaneous equation system 
similar to Lowry and Shu, 2002, Field et al., 2005, Arena and Julio, 2015, and Kini et al. (2017).7 
Specifically, we use the following system of equations:  
(1) YieldSpread = 𝜆𝜆1LitigationRisk + 𝛽𝛽1X1 + 𝛾𝛾1X + e1, 
(2) LitigationRisk = 𝜆𝜆2YieldSpread + 𝛽𝛽2X2 + 𝛾𝛾2X + e2, 
I use two proxies of litigation risk. The first proxy is the Lawsuit dummy that, as in Lowry and 
Shu (2002), assumes the value of one for the firms that are involved in a litigation in the following year, 
and zero otherwise. The second proxy is Industry litigation risk, which measure litigation risk at the 
industry level.8 X1 is leverage, the identifying variable of the first equation, an exogenous firm 
characteristic that is related to yield spread but not to litigation risk. Leverage has a direct effect of 
debt costs. However, litigation risk studies have not found a significant relation between leverage and 
litigation risk (e.g., Arena and Julio, 2015). X2 is stock turnover, the identifying variable of the second 
equation, an exogenous variable that is directly related to the probability of a lawsuit but not to yield 
spread. Stock turnover is a significant predictor of future lawsuits as possible settlements tend to 
increase based on the number of shares traded during the period under litigation (Kim and 
Skinner, 2012). However, while in some situations stock turnover and bond yields might be affected by 
common factors, stock turnover does not have a direct causal effect on yield spreads. X consists of a 
vector of control variables that are potentially related to both debt costs and the risk of litigation. 
The simultaneous equation model with the lawsuit dummy as proxy for litigation risk has both a 
continuous dependent variable (yield spread) and a dichotomous one (the lawsuit dummy). To 
estimate this model I apply the two-stage methodology introduced by Maddala (1983). The first stage 
regressions are an OLS and a probit regression with all the exogenous explanatory variables. In the 
second stage, I substitute the endogenous variables yield spread and litigation with their fitted values 
from the first stage. The simultaneous equation model with the industry litigation risk as litigation risk 
proxy is a traditional 2SLS as both first stage regressions are OLS. 
Table 11 presents the results of the second-stage regressions. In Panel A the Lawsuit dummy 
instrument, the fitted value from the first stage, is positive and statically significantly related to yield 
spread. However, the yield spread instrument is not significantly related to the lawsuit dummy in the 
second equation. As expected, leverage and stock turnover, the two identifying variables are 
statistically significant and positively related to yield spread and the lawsuit dummy, respectively. The 
results presented in Panel B present a similar picture. The Industry litigation risk instrument is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level while the yield spread instrument is not significantly related 
to Industry litigation risk. Overall, the results presented in Table 11 confirm the findings presented in 
the previous sections of the paper and dispel to a greater degree the concerns about the relation 
between litigation risk and debt costs being spuriously driven by endogeneity issues.9 
Table 11. Yield spread and litigation risk: simultaneous equations. 
Panel A: Yield spread and lawsuit dummy 
Second stage dependent variable Yield spread Lawsuit dummy  
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Lawsuit dummy instrument 341.7438 .000 
  
Yield spread instrument 
  
−0.0025 .389 





Ln assets −45.9754 .005 0.2174 .000 
Ln marketcap −80.9359 .000 0.0410 .353 
ROA −265.4611 .000 −0.8007 .000 
Market-to-book −39.4386 .000 0.0811 .001 
Loss −8.0479 .693 0.3334 .000 
Fixed assets 15.0957 .381 −0.0416 .395 
Cap ex 442.9097 .000 −1.2173 .154 
Altman's Z 0.0023 .445 0.0000 .522 
_cons 1489.0500 .000 −2.9574 .000 





N 12,604 12,604 
Panel B: Yield spread and industry litigation risk 
Second stage dependent variable Yield spread Ind. lit. risk  
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Ind. lit. risk instrument 3066.3780 .000 
  
Yield spread instrument 
  
−0.0001 .476 





Ln assets −30.5927 .019 −0.0031 .488 
Ln marketcap −92.0123 .000 0.0138 .006 
ROA −225.1049 .005 −0.0754 .001 
Market-to-book −15.7503 .134 0.0023 .477 
Loss −19.4810 .408 0.0320 .000 
Fixed assets 62.7597 .002 −0.0203 .000 
Cap ex 191.1722 .039 −0.0558 .156 
Altman's Z −0.0007 .735 0.0000 .624 
_cons 68.5254 .172 0.0934 .000 
Adj. R2 0.2754 0.1143 
N 12,604 12,604 
This table reports the estimation results for the following simultaneous equations model: 
Yield spread = λ1Litigation+β1X1+γ1X +e1, 
Litigation =λ2Yield spread+β2X2+γ2X +e2, 
Litigation is the Lawsuit dummy in Panel A and Industry litigation risk in Panel B; X1 is leverage, the identifying 
variable of the first equation, and X2 is stock turnover, the identifying variable of the second equation. All 
variables are described in the appendix. The regressions include year fixed effects. Statistical significant 
coefficients are reported in bold. 
6.3. Robustness test 
The sample period of this study includes the years of the financial crisis and the great recession (2008–
2009). During the recession, systematic and idiosyncratic risk significantly increased while debt 
issuance by firms significantly declined. Even though our sample excludes financial firms, which were 
the most affected by the financial crisis, there is the possibility that the relation between litigation risk 
and debt for those two years is biased by the large rise in other forms of risk and the relation between 
the incidence of lawsuits and other variables that are strongly influenced by the recessionary 
environment. As a robustness check, I replicate all the tests of this study excluding the recession years. 
All the coefficients of the regressions maintain their sign and significance. 
7. Conclusions 
The cost of debt financing is of great importance for corporations. Most corporate financial decisions 
including investment choices, capital structure policy, divisions’ performance evaluations, and payout 
policy are heavily influenced by the cost of debt. Kisgen, 2006, Kisgen, 2009) shows that also capital 
structure decisions are directly affected by a firm's credit rating. As corporate litigation risk and 
litigation costs are ever increasing, it is important to fully understand how litigation affects a firm's 
creditworthiness and cost of debt. This study investigates this issue by looking at a comprehensive 
panel of U.S. lawsuits and by examining the impact of litigation on debt financing both at its risk 
inception and at its resolution when settlements costs are incurred. 
The results of this study suggests that litigation affect firm's creditworthiness and debt costs in two 
steps. Firms experience a decline in credit ratings and increase in cost of debt as litigation risk 
increases, which in turn reduce the firms’ reliance on debt financing. At the time of the lawsuit 
resolution, if settlement costs are high, credit rating agencies downgrade firms again, and cost of debt 
increases further. The results are robust to endogeneity concerns, and the use of alternative proxies of 
litigation risk and settlement costs. 
Appendix A. Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Altman's Z 1.2 (Working Capital/Total Assets) + 1.4 (Retained Earnings/Total 
Assets) + 3.3 (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/Total 
Assets) + 0.6 (Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Long-Term 
Debt) + (Net Sales/Total Assets). 
Compustat 
Asset growth Percent growth in assets from year t−1 to year t. Compustat 
Cap ex Capital expenditures divided by assets. Compustat 
Credit rating Numerical score set to 7 for AAA ratings, 6 for AA ratings, 5 for A 
ratings, 4 for BBB ratings, 3 for BB ratings, 2 for B ratings, and 1 




Debt issuance minus debt retirement divided by assets. Compustat 
Yield spread Weighted average of the yield spread of corporate bonds and 
bank loans on the issuance year expressed as bps over the 




Equity sales minus equity purchases divided by total assets. Compustat 
Fixed assets Fixed assets divided by total assets. Compustat 
Industry 
litigation risk 
Number of lawsuits filed each year against firms in the same 





Indicator variable equal to 1 when the settlement costs are 
higher than the firm's cash holdings, and 0 otherwise. 
Audit analytics 
and compustat 
Leverage Book value of total long-term debt plus the book value of total 




Indicator variable that assumes the value of one if a firm is sued 
in the following year, and zero otherwise. 
Audit analytics 
Litigation risk Predicted probability of litigation estimated with a probit 





Ln assets Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Compustat 
Ln marketCap Natural logarithm of the market value of equity. CRSP 
Ln maturity Natural logarithm of the weighted average maturity of all debt 
issued each year by the firm. The weight is based on the principal 
of each debt issue. 
SDC 
Ln principal Natural logarithm of the total principal amount of all debt issued 
each year by the firm. 
SDC 
Loss Indicator variable equal to one if the firm posts a loss for the 




Book assets minus book equity plus market equity all divided by 
book assets. 
Compustat 
ROA Earnings before extraordinary items plus interest expense plus 
income statement deferred taxes divided by assets. 
Compustat 
Settlement Lawsuit settlement paid by the defendant firms in millions of 
dollars. For lawsuits that are dismissed, withdrawn, or resolved in 
favor of the defendant firm, settlement assumes the value of 
zero. 
Audit analytics 
Ln settlement Logarithm of (Settlement+1) Audit analytics 
Settlement 
cash 
Lawsuit settlement paid by the defendant firms divided by the 





Indicator variable equal to 1 if the lawsuits resolved into a 




Number of years from the lawsuit filing date and the lawsuit 
resolution. 
Audit analytics 
Appendix B. Probit estimation of litigation risk 
 
Coeff. p-value 
Stock return −0.3451 .000 
Return volatility 0.4732 .015 
Return skewness −0.2143 .024 
Stock turnover 1.4528 .000 
NYSE 0.3534 .018 
Previous litigation dummy 0.0489 .097 
Litigation intensity 0.0785 .002 
Regulated industry 0.0463 .234 
HiTec dummy 0.2694 .048 
Discretionary accruals −0.0245 .573 
Obs 13,326 
Pseudo R2 0.228 
This appendix table reports coefficient estimates and p-values of the probit regressions used to estimate the 
litigation risk variable used in the study. The left hand side variable is an event dummy set equal to one in the 
year a securities lawsuit is initiated against a firm. Stock return is the market-adjusted 12-month stock return. 
Return volatility is the standard deviation of the firm's 12-month return. Return skewness is the skewness of the 
firm's 12-month returns. Stock turnover is the trading volume accumulated over the previous 12 months scaled 
by the beginning of the year shares outstanding, all multiplied by 1000.NYSE equal 1 if the firm is listed on the 
New York Exchange. The previous litigation dummy is set equal to one if the firm has been the defendant of 
another litigation in the previous three years. Litigation intensity is the proportion of firms in a given 4-digit SIC 
industry that were brought into litigation in a given year. The regulated dummy is set equal to one for firms in 
regulated industries. The Hitech dummy assumes the value of one for firms in the biotech, computer, electronics 
or retail industry. The discretionary accruals are estimated from a modified Jones model for financial year 
preceding the lawsuit. Statistically significant coefficients are reported in bold. 
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 1BP issued a 10-year bond with a yield spread of 2.05% in the fall of 2010. The spread was 30 basis 
points higher than for a similar 10-year bond issued just before the oil spill (1.75%). 
2Most corporate lawsuit settlements are paid as a lump sum. Settlements of injury and product liability 
cases can be “structured”, i.e. paid over time in form of an annuity. Moreover, many companies 
buy C-side litigation insurance which can cover some of the settlement costs (Arena and 
Ferris, 2017). Even though these factors might reduce the full impact of settlement costs, out 
study is still likely to underestimate overall litigation costs due to non-measurable reputational 
costs associated with most corporate lawsuits. 
3The three 3-digit SIC industries with the highest incidence of lawsuits in our sample are the software 
industry (14.5% of all sample lawsuits), the pharmaceutical industry (11.0% of all sample 
lawsuits), and the electronic components industry (7.6% of all sample lawsuits). 
4For lawsuits that are dismissed, withdrawn, or resolved in favor of the defendant firm, settlement 
assumes the value of zero. 
5In unreported regressions, I test the relation between litigation risk and equity issuance while 
including the same controls of the regressions of Table 8 along with debt issuance. The 
litigation risk proxies are not statistically significant in those tests. 
6Table 10 presents only the results of regressions with litigation risk as proxy for risk of litigation. 
Specification with lawsuit dummy and industry litigation risk as litigation proxies generate 
similar results. The results for those alternative specification are available upon request. 
7Another empirical approach to control for endogeneity is based on confining the analysis to a specific 
exogenous event that alters litigation risk. Gormley and Matsa (2011) focus their study on 
companies affected by the categorization of specific chemicals as carcinogens. Taillard (2013) 
uses asbestos legislation as an exogenous shock that alters litigation risk for a set of affected 
industries. 
8Litigation Risk, the third proxy used in the rest of the paper, is excluded from this test because it is 
constructed with a probit regression that includes stock turnover, one of the two identifying 
variables of the simultaneous equation model. 
9In an unreported analysis we estimate a simultaneous equation with industry litigation risk and credit 
ratings. The results are consistent with those presented in Table 11. Litigation risk affects credit 
ratings while a change in credit ratings does not affect litigation risk. 
 
 
